Traditionally, a ciphertext from an identity-based broadcast encryption can be distributed to a group of receivers whose identities are included in the ciphertext. Once the ciphertext has been created, it is not possible to remove any intended receivers from it without conducting decryption. In this paper, we consider an interesting question: how to remove target designated receivers from a ciphertext generated by an anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption? The solution to this question is found applicable to file sharing with revocation. In this work, we found an affirmative answer to this question. We construct an anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption, which offers the user revocation of ciphertext and the revocation process does not reveal any information of the plaintext and receiver identity. In our proposed scheme, the group of receiver identities are anonymous and only known by the encryptor. We prove that our scheme is semantically secure in the random oracle model. Abstract. Traditionally, a ciphertext from an identity-based broadcast encryption can be distributed to a group of receivers whose identities are included in the ciphertext. Once the ciphertext has been created, it is not possible to remove any intended receivers from it without conducting decryption. In this paper, we consider an interesting question: how to remove target designated receivers from a ciphertext generated by an anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption? The solution to this question is found applicable to file sharing with revocation. In this work, we found an affirmative answer to this question. We construct an anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption, which offers the user revocation of ciphertext and the revocation process does not reveal any information of the plaintext and receiver identity. In our proposed scheme, the group of receiver identities are anonymous and only known by the encryptor. We prove that our scheme is semantically secure in the random oracle model.
Introduction
In a broadcast encryption system, a file can be encrypted for a group of receivers such that any receiver in the group can decrypt the ciphertext using its respective private key. The users outside the group learn nothing about the encrypted file even if they collude. Broadcast encryption is a useful way for data sharing, where receivers can obtain the broadcast (or shared) data with their private keys. However, directly applying a broadcast encryption for data sharing in database systems or cloud computing might suffer from some drawbacks. For example, it cannot preserve the receiver privacy, since all receiver identities must be attached with the ciphertext. Therefore, if applying an identity-based broadcast encryption scheme to file sharing, an anonymous broadcast encryption would be more desirable.
We consider an application scenario using an anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption, where the file sharing system for a company is supplied by a cloud service. Without losing generality, let's assume that the system involves a cloud server, file owner, and a group of users. The file owner first encrypts a file for a selected group S, and then stores the encrypted file in the cloud for sharing. When some users R leave the company, the server must revoke them from accessing all files. If the revoked users are in S, they cannot decrypt the ciphertext after the server conducts revocation. Mostly important, it requires the cloud server to be able to revoke users from a ciphertext without knowing the encrypted file and the identities of receivers.
A trivial solution to the scenario is to adopt the "decrypt then re-encrypt" approach. It requires the server to have the ability to decrypt the ciphertext. When some identities should be revoked, the server first decrypts the ciphertext and removes them from the original authorized user set. It then re-encrypts the file using the new authorized user set. However, in this trivial solution, the cloud server is able to learn the content and the identity of authorized users who can access the file. Alternatively, the cloud server without decryption right can encrypt the ciphertext by using the broadcast encryption scheme (e.g. [21] ) where anyone can decrypt the ciphertext except the revoked users. This method guarantees that the cloud server cannot get any useful information about the content and the authorized users' identities from the original ciphertext. The limitation is that this method could cause a collusion attack. For example, let ID i be the identity of User i; if ID 1 / ∈ S ∪ R, ID 2 ∈ S ∩ R, ID 1 can use its private key to help ID 2 recover the original ciphertext, then ID 2 uses its private key to decrypt the original ciphertext.
Our Contributions. We notice that there is no ideal trivial solution to the aforementioned problem. In this work, we provide a solution to the stated problem earlier and show how to revoke users' identities from the ciphertext without the knowledge of the plaintext and the knowledge of the receivers. We propose a new cryptographic notion called anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption with revocation (AIBBER) to realize this. Our novel solution allows the cloud server to revoke users' identities without decryption and achieves full anonymity where only the sender knows the receivers' identities. We present two security models to meet the requirements of the proposed notion and show that our construction is secure under the attacks in the proposed model. In our setting, both the system public key and user private key are constant. The computation in revocation phase is small, more precisely O(t), where t is the number of revoked identities.
Related Work
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption. Since Fiat and Naor [15] formally introduced broadcast encryption, subsequent works [9, 10, 3, 8, 16, 25, 6] have proposed broadcast encryption systems with different properties. They mainly focused on reducing public key sizes, private key sizes, ciphertext sizes and computational costs for encryption and decryption. The notion of identity-based broadcast encryption was introduced by Sakai and Furukawa [26] , and Delerablée's work [8] achieves constant size ciphertext and private keys. In these schemes, the receiver identities must be attached with the ciphertext, which exposes the privacy of the receivers.
The first work addressing the anonymity in broadcast encryption appeared in [1] . The authors presented the notion of private broadcast encryption to protect the identities of the receivers and gave a generic construction from any key indistinguishable CCA scheme, which achieves receiver anonymity and CCA security. The security in [1] depends on a strongly secure one-time signature. Boneh, Sahai and Waters [4] extended this notion to construct private linear broadcast encryption and proposed a fully collusion resistant tracing traitors scheme with sublinear size ciphertexts and constant size private keys. However, the receivers cannot be arbitrary sets of users. Subsequently, many anonymous ID-based broadcast encryption schemes were proposed [18, 22, 14, 28, 12] .
Libert, Paterson and Quaglia [22] examined the security of the number-theoretic construction in [1] and suggested the proof techniques without the random oracle. The authors proposed an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme that achieves adaptive security without random oracles. The ciphertext in their schemes are linear of the number of receivers and the security depends on a one-time signature. Later, Fazio and Perera [14] formalized the notion of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption, which lies between the complete lack of protection that characterizes traditional broadcast encryption scheme [15] and the full anonymity in [1] . Their constructions achieve sublinear ciphertext length but fail to obtain anonymity among the receiver.
The work of Kiayias and Samari [19] aimed to study the lower bounds for the ciphertext size of private broadcast encryption. They showed that an atomic private broadcast encryption scheme with fully anonymous must have a ciphertext size of Ω(n · k), where n is the number of broadcast set and k is the security parameter. Recently, Fazio, Nicolosi and Perera [13] studied the broadcast steganography and introduced a new construction called outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts, which achieves sublinear ciphertext size and is secure without random oracles.
Revocation. The revocation schemes in the literature only guarantee the revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext. While the revocation in our paper focuses on how to revoke the identities from a group of users S. Only the users who are in S but not in the revocation set can retrieve the plaintext. Revocation system is a variant of the broadcast encryption system, where it takes a set of revoked users as input to the encryption function. Several elegant revocation constructions [23, 24, 11, 17, 5, 21, 20] have been proposed. Naor, Naor and Lotspiech [23] presented a technique called subset-cover framework, and based on this framework they proposed the first stateless tree-based revocation scheme which was secure against a collision of any number of users. Boneh and Waters [5] introduced a primitive called augmented broadcast encryption which was claimed to be sufficient for constructing trace and revoke schemes. The authors proposed a revocation scheme with sublinear size ciphertexts and private keys. The scheme was proved to be secure against adaptive adversaries.
Lewko, Sahai and Waters [21] proposed a revocation system with very small private keys using the "two equation" technique. The primary challenge is to achieve full collusion resilience. Anyone can decrypt the ciphertext and get the broadcast message except the revoked users even if they collude. In Lewko et al.'s scheme, the ciphertext size is O(t) and the size of the public key is constant, where t is the number of revoked users. Recently, to narrow the scope of decrypter in [21] , a single revocation encryption (SRE) scheme was presented by Lee et al. [20] , which allows a sender to broadcast a message to a group of selected users and one group user is revoked. Any group member can decrypt the ciphertext except the revoked user. The authors then proposed a public key trace and revoke scheme by combining the layered subset difference scheme and their SRE scheme.
Broadcast Proxy Re-Encryption. The concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE) was introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [2] , which provides a flexible and secure way to share data. PRE allows an honest-but-curious proxy to turn a ciphertext intended for a receiver into another ciphertext intended for another receiver. While, the proxy cannot learn any useful information about the plaintext during the transformation. Chu et al. [7] extended this notion to construct the proxy broadcast re-encryption (PBRE). Compared with PRE, PBRE allows the proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for a receiver set to another ciphertext intended for another receiver set. Recently, motivated by the cloud email system, Xu et al. [27] presented a conditional identity-based broadcast proxy reencryption scheme with constant ciphertext based on [8] . In both the PRE and PBRE system, the data owner has to delegate a re-encryption key to the proxy and the proxy knows the new receivers' identities.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries including complexity assumption, the formal definition of anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption with revocation and the corresponding security models. The concrete construction is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show the security proofs of our scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Complexity Assumption
Let G and G T be two cyclic groups of the same prime order p. A bilinear map is a map e : G × G → G T which satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear: For all P, Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z * p , we have e (aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G such that e (P, Q) = 1. 3. Computability: It is efficient to compute e (P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G.
A bilinear group BG = (G, G T , e, p) is composed of objects as described above.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH). Let BG = (G, G T , e, p) be a bilinear group with a generator P ∈ G. The BDH problem in (G, G T , e) is as follows: Given a tuple (P, aP, bP, cP ) for some unknown a, b, c ∈ Z * p as input, output e(P, P )
Anonymous ID-Based Broadcast Encryption with Revocation
The AIBBER system is derived from Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) [8] with more functions. Formally, an AIBBER scheme consists of the algorithms AIBBER = (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Revoke, Decrypt) defined as follows.
Taking a security parameter 1 λ as input, it outputs a master public key mpk and a master secrete key msk. The mpk is publicly known while the msk is kept secretly. KeyGen (mpk, msk, ID): Taking the master key pair (msk, mpk) and a user identity ID as input, it outputs a private key d ID for ID.
Encrypt (mpk, M, S): Taking the master public key mpk, a message M and a set of identities S = (ID 1 , ID 2 , ..., ID n ) as input, it outputs a ciphertext CT . Revoke (mpk, R, CT ): Taking the master public key mpk, a ciphertext CT and a revocation identity set R = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID t ) as input, it outputs a new ciphertext CT with R. Decrypt (mpk, CT , ID, d ID ): Taking the master public key mpk, a ciphertext CT , an identity ID and the private key d ID as input. It outputs the message M if ID ∈ S and ID / ∈ R.
Correctness. Note that if t = 0, the AIBBER scheme is AIBBE scheme. Thus, it requires that for any
Security Models
The security of AIBBER scheme requires that without a valid private key, both the encrypted message and the intended receivers are unknown to the adversary. Let CT be the original ciphertext for receivers S, R be the revoke users and CT be the ciphertext after revocation. The security requires:
1. The message in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S. The message in CT cannot be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S and ID / ∈ R. 2. The identity set in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S. The identity set in CT cannot be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S and ID / ∈ R.
We define the IND-ID-CPA security and ANON-ID-CPA security for the AIBBER system in a similar way as anonymous IBBE system. IND-ID-CPA Security. IND-ID-CPA security in AIBBER allows the adversary to issue the private key query to obtain the private key associated with any identity ID of her choice. The adversary is challenged on an identity set S * , two messages M 0 , M 1 of its choice and a revocation identity set R * . Adversary's goal is to distinguish whether the challenge ciphertext is encrypted under M 0 or M 1 for S * with some restrictions. We say that adversary breaks the scheme if it guesses the message correctly. Specifically, the notion of IND-ID-CPA is defined under the following game between the challenger C and the PPT adversary A. Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the master public key mpk and master secret key msk. Then it sends the mpk to A and keeps the msk secretly. Phase 1: A issues private key queries. Upon receiving a private key query for ID i . C runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate the private key d IDi and sends the result back to A. Challenge: When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct messages M 0 , M 1 from the same message space, a challenge identity set S * = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID n ) and a revocation identity set R * = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID t ) with the restriction that A has not queried the private key on ID i in Phase 1, where ID i ∈ S * and ID i / ∈ R * . C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT * as follows:
If R * = ∅, set CT * = CT as the challenge ciphertext, otherwise set CT * = CT as the challenge ciphertext, then send CT * to A.
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries as in Phase 1, but it cannot query the private key on ID i where ID i ∈ S * and ID i / ∈ R * .
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess b ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-ID-CPA adversary and define adversary A's advantage in attacking the scheme as Adv
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. ANON-ID-CPA Security. ANON-ID-CPA security in AIBBER allows the adversary to issue the private key query to obtain the private key of any identity ID of its choice. Similarly, the adversary is challenged on a message M * , two identity sets S 0 , S 1 and a revocation identity set R * of its choice. Adversary's goal is to distinguish whether the challenge ciphertext is generated under S 0 or S 1 with some restrictions. We say that adversary breaks the scheme if it guesses the identity set correctly. Specifically, the notion of ANON-ID-CPA is defined under the following game between the challenger C and the PPT adversary A. Setup: C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the master public key mpk and master secret key msk. Then it sends the mpk to A and keeps the msk secretly. Phase 1: A issues private key queries. Upon receiving a private key query for ID i . C runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate the private key d IDi and sends the result back to A. Challenge: When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a message M * , two distinct identity sets S 0 = (ID 0,1 , ID 0,2 , ..., ID 0,n ), S 1 = (ID 1,1 , ID 1,2 , ..., ID 1,n ) and a revocation set R * = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID t ). We require that A has not issued the private key queries on ID i in Phase 1, where ID i ∈ (S 0 ∪ S 1 )\(S 0 ∩ S 1 ). C randomly picks a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT * as follows:
Phase 2: A issues more private key queries as in Phase 1, but it cannot query the private key on any ID i , where
We refer to such an adversary A as an ANON-ID-CPA adversary and define adversary A's advantage in attacking the scheme as Adv
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary. 3 The Proposed Scheme
Construction
Setup: Given a security parameter 1 λ , the setup algorithm randomly chooses a bilinear group BG = (G, G T , e, p) with a generator P ∈ G, s ∈ Z * p and computes P pub = sP . It then picks four cryptographic hash functions H : {0,
The master public key and master secret key are mpk = {BG, P, P pub , H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 }, msk = s.
KeyGen: Given the master key pair (mpk, msk) and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , this algorithm outputs the private key
Encrypt: Given the master public key mpk, a set of identity S = (ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n ) and a message M ∈ G, this algorithm randomly chooses r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z * p and v ∈ G.
We have f i (x i ) = 1 and f i (x j ) = 0 for i = j. Then it creates the ciphertext CT as C 0 = v + M, C 1 = r 1 P, C 2 = r 2 P, together with, for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n:
, the master public key mpk and a revocation identity set R, where |R| = t. It requires t < n. If R = ∅, this algorithm sets CT = CT . Otherwise, it randomly chooses u ∈ G and computes
Then it sets b i = 0 for i = t + 1, t + 2, · · · , n − 1 and for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n computes
, an identity ID i , a private key d IDi and the master public key mpk, this algorithm computes x i = H(ID i ) and
Then it computes x j = H(ID j ) for each ID j ∈ R to reconstruct g(x) as:
Finally, it uses the private key d IDi to compute
and recovers the message M = C 0 − u − v . If the identity ID i ∈ S and ID i / ∈ R, we have u = u, v = v, then it obtains the correct M after decryption.
Note: For simplicity, we omit the modulo operation and assume that the coefficients of all polynomials are from Z * p in the rest of paper.
Discussion and Correctness
One may think that after revocation, the revocation set may be updated multiple times. Our scheme allows the server to update the revocation set. For each update, the server uses the original ciphertext and the new revocation set to perform the Revoke algorithm. Thus, the server needs to store the original ciphertext CT in our scheme. In our setting, there is no requirement of R ⊂ S. The revocation set R can be arbitrary users.
From our setting, only the users in S can decryption the ciphertext CT . After revocation, the revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext CT . We note that if ID ∈ R, g(H(ID)) = 0 and g(H(ID))u = 1 G . The user with identity ID cannot retrieve one of the decryption keys u, even all users in R conclude. To obtain the decryption keys u and v, the user must belong to S and not belong to R. Thus our scheme ensures that even if all the revoked users collude, they still cannot access the file and learn the identities of receivers.
Next we show that our construction meets the requirements of correctness as we claimed in the Section 2.3. If x i = H(ID i ) is computed correctly, for any ID i ∈ S and ID i / ∈ R, we have g(x i ) = 0 and
A 2 + · · · + a n,0 + a n,1 x i + a n,2 x 2 i + · · · + a n,n−1 x n−1 i
The user ID i uses its private key d IDi to remove A i from Q i via above computation. As g(x i ) = 0 , the user can obtain u.
B 2 + · · · + a n,0 + a n,1 x i + a n,2 x 2 i + · · · + a n,n−1 x n−1 i
After recovering u and v, we get the message as , where n is the number of the broadcast identities.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break our scheme with advantage . We build a simulator S that can solve the BDH problem with advantage by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random instance of BDH problem taken as input by S and its goal is to compute e(P, P ) abc . In order to use A to solve the problem, S needs to simulate a challenger and respond all the queries for A. For simplicity, we assume that the H 2 and H 3 query is after the H 1 query for the same identity. S works by interacting with A in an IND-ID-CPA game as follows: Setup: S sets P pub = aP and creates mpk = (p, P, P pub , e, H). H 1 -queries: A makes H 1 queries. S responds to a query on ID i as follow. S maintains a list L 1 of a tuple (ID i , c i , r i , h i ). This list is initially empty. S first checks the L 1 . If the query ID i already appears on the L 1 in a tuple (ID i , c i , r i , h i ), it returns the corresponding h i as the value of H 1 (ID i ). Otherwise, do the following: 
Challenge: When A decides Phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct messages M 0 , M 1 , a challenge identity set S * = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID n ) and a revocation identity set R * = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID t ) under the restriction that A has not queried the private key on ID i in Phase 1, where ID i ∈ S * and ID i / ∈ R * . S randomly picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and does the follows: Case 1: R * = ∅. In this case, S randomly picks r * ∈ Z * p , C * 0 ∈ G, for each ID i ∈ S * , i = 1, 2 · · · , n, randomly chooses A i , B * i ∈ G and computes x * i = H(ID i ),
Then S generates the challenge ciphertext CT * as C 0 , C * 1 = r * cP, C * 2 = cP , together with, for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n :
Case 2: R * = ∅. In this case, S does the follows:
is not in the L 1 , do H 1 queries to get r i ). Then it computes X i = e(aP, cP ) 
and set
A issues private key queries as needed, but it cannot query the private key on ID i , where ID i ∈ S * and ID i / ∈ R * . S responds as in Phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess b ∈ {0, 1}. Probability Analysis. Note that in the case R * = ∅, we can view v * as the encryption key to encrypt the challenge message. Let W = (e(H 1 (ID i ), P pub ) c , ID i ) where ID i ∈ S * . In the real scheme, B * i = v * + H 3 (W ), thus we also can regard H 3 (W ) as the encryption key to encrypt v * . Before querying the H 3 value of W , the result of H 3 (W ) is unknown and random. From the view of adversary, v * is encrypted with a random number key independent of W . Therefore, B * i is a one-time pad. In other words, the challenge ciphertext is a one-time pad. According to the assumption(A can break our scheme with advantage ), the adversary will query H 3 on W . In this case, simulator decides the corresponding hard problem's solution is in the L 3 and can solve it with probability δ n . When R * = ∅, we can view v * and u * as the encryption key to encrypt the challenge message. However, in this case, the adversary can retrieve v * by querying the private key of (ID i ∈ S * ) ∧ (ID i ∈ R * ). That is, the message encryption key is only u
i )u * , we can regard Ω as the encryption key to encrypt u * . Before querying the H 2 value of Ω, the result of H 2 (Ω) is unknown and random. From the view of adversary, u * is encrypted with a random number key independent of Ω. Therefore, Q * is a one-time pad, that is, the challenge ciphertext is a one-time pad. According to the assumption(A can break our scheme with advantage ), the adversary will query H 2 on Ω. In this case, simulator can decides the solution of the corresponding hard problem is in the L 3 and solve it with probability δ n−l where l = |S * ∩ R * |. Here, we define the query which can solve the hard problem as useful query.
If useful query happens, it means c j = 0, H 1 (ID j ) = r j bP and d IDj = r j abP . From the decryption algorithm, we have e(C * 1 , d IDj ) = e(P, P ) The above completes the description of simulation algorithm S. To complete the security proof, it remains to show that S correctly outputs e (P, P ) abc with advantage at least . According to our above analysis, we first define the following events:
Simulation dose not abort in private key query. Note that the identity ID i ∈ S * ∩ R * allows to query the corresponding private key. In our setting, these identities cannot be used to distinguish the challenge messages. Since |S * ∩ R * | = l, the potential useful identity is n − l. Thus we have above result
Finally, from the simulator's point of view, if adversary can guess the correct b and with the conditions that E 1 , E 2 , E 3 happen, it only knows that the solution of the hard problem is in the L 2 or L 3 , but it dose not know which one is, thus Pr[
It is clear that these four events are independent, therefore, we have
The function (1 − δ) q E · δ is maximized at δ = 1 q E +1 , we have
For a large q E , 1 − 1 q E +1 q E +1 ≈ 1 e , thus we have
q E · δ · n(q H2 + q H3 ) ≈ n · e · q E · (q H2 + q H3 ) .
This completes the proof.
Discussion. When R * = ∅, the challenge message is encrypted by v * . If the adversary can distinguish the message, the simulator can decide it must have queried the H 3 value with the input embedding the hard problem, but simulator does not know which input embeds the hard problem. In this case, Pr[E 4 ] = . Theorem 2. Suppose the hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are random oracles. The proposed scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure under the BDH assumption. Specifically, suppose there is an ANON-ID-CPA adversary A that has advantage against our proposed scheme. A makes at most q E private key queries and q H1 , q H2 , q H3 queries to the functions H 1 , H 2 and H 3 respectively. Then there is an algorithm S to solve the BDH problem with advantage ≥ n·e·q E ·(q H 2 +q H 3 ) , where n is the number of broadcast identities.
